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tion so voted. The better view permits ratification if the salaries are
reasonable and not excessive. Majority stockholders are bound to act in
good faith.'" Courts use language to the effect that stockholders do not
stand in the same fiduciary relation toward each other as directors do
toward stockholders," yet the modern rule is that powers granted a
corporation, whether exercised by directors or stockholders, are to be
exercised only in good faith and with a view to the benefit of the corpo-
ration.' 2 Where the salaries so fixed may be found to be excessive and
unreasonable, the minority stockholders are protected by their right to
appeal to equity. The court will ascertain the reasonableness of the
salary and, if necessary, give adequate relief.' 3
The principal case, adopting the view of the Brggs case,' 4 accepts
the minority or void rule. The rule, simply stated, is that a resolution
of majority directors determining their own salaries as officers is *void
and of no legal effect. It cannot be ratified. Application of the void
rule is not essential for the protection of minority stockholders from
unfair contracts. The voidable rule gives thorough protection to the
minority by putting upon the majority the burden of proving a fair
contract.
P.A.
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW - EMBEZZLEMENT OF REAL PROPERTY
An attorney was indicted under the Ohio G.C. sec. 12467 on a
charge of aiding, abetting and assisting the receiver' of a Building and
Loan Company to embezzle certain parcels of real estate. A judgment
sustaining a general demurrer and dismissing the indictment was
'°Kavanaugk v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 2z6 N. Y. 185, 2z3 N.E. 148 (1919);
Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. Rep. 391, 16 Law. Rep. Ann. N.S.
89z (igo8); Outwater v. Public Service Corp. of N. J., 103 N. J. Eq. 461, 143 Atl. 7z9
(xz8); BERLE AND MEANs, TnE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1938)
p" 1'Russel v. Patterson Co., 23Z Pa. 113, 81 Ad. 136 (2922); Sotter v. Coatesville
Boiler Works, 257 Pa. 411, 2o Atl. 744 (917); Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, (supra,
note 8).
1 Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 53 Ad. 842 (1902); A. A.
Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1049 (1932).
"aMiner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 NAV. z18 (s89z); see annotation
in z7 A.L.R. 300.
, Note z (supra).
Both the receiver and the attorney were indicted in the court below under the false
pretense statute, Ohio G.C., sec. 13104, as well as the embezzlement statute, G.C., sec.
1 2467. The aider and abettor counts under the false pretense statute were held properly
dismissed but only because of an insufficient allegation of necessary elements and a con-
sequent failure to charge the offense.
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affirmed on the ground that real property is not subject to embezzle-
ment.2 State v. Clark. 6o Ohio App. 367, 21 N.E. (2d) 484, 14
Ohio Op. 369 (1938).
The evidence before the grand jury tended to indicate that by elab-
orate manipulations involving the services of defendant as attorney, the
receiver passed title to the properties through dummy purchasers to the
real purchasers. The common pleas court authorized the sales for Loan
Company deposits, on the sworn statement of the receiver. It was
charged that, in fact, the real purchaser paid in cash about one-third
more than the value of the deposits accounted for by the receiver.
The embezzlement statute, Ohio G.C. sec. 12467, reads as fol-
lows: "Whoever, being . . . receiver . . . embezzles, or converts to
his own use, fraudulently takes or makes away with, or secrets
with intent to embezzle or convert to his own use, anything of value
which shall come into his possession by virtue of his election, appoint-
ment, or employment . . . shall be imprisoned . . . or fined . . . or
both."
"Anything of value" is defined for the entire Part Fourth (Penal)
of the General Code in sec. 12369, to include "money, bills, bonds, or
notes issued by lawful authority and intended to pass and circulate as
money, goods and chattels, promissory notes, bills of exchange, orders,
drafts, warrants, checks, or bonds given for payment of money or other
property, rights in action and things which savor of the realty and are
at the time they are taken, a part of the freehold, whether they be of the
substance or produce thereof or affixed thereto, although there may be
no interval between the severing and taking away, and every other thing
of value."
Relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis the court said that real
estate itself was not included in the term "anything of value" as it is
used in Ohio G.C. sec. 12467, i.e., that only articles removable from
the real estate were intended. The prosecutor relied on the case of
State v. Toney, Si Ohio St. 130, 90 N.E. 142, i8 Ann. Cas. 395
(i909) which held that the title to real estate could be the subject of
obt-,ining property by false pretenses. The false pretense statute, now
Ohio G.C. sec. I3104, also contains the phrase, "anything of value":
"WXhoever by false pretenses . . . obtains anything of value . . . shall
be imprisoned . . . or fined . . . or both." (Italics added in each
instance.)
" A cond appeal, under a new indictment, from an order overruling defendant's
motion for a directed verdict was dismissed on the basis that no appeal lies from such an
order in a criminal case. State v. Clark, 61 Ohio App. s56, z8 Ohio L. Abs. 339, IS
Ohio Op. 119, zzN.E. (zd) 45S (1939).
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The court in the principal case said that the Toney case was not
controlling on the embezzlement counts. The opinion was interpreted
as having been based entirely on the effect of a revision of the false
pretense statute in i88o. The phrase "any money, goods, merchandise
or effects whatsoever" had been replaced by "anything of value." This
was regarded as a change of substance indicating an intention to enlarge
the scope of the false pretense section so as to include real property.
In the light of this emphasis, it is interesting to trace the history of
the embezzlement statute in Ohio. Apparently the first embezzlement
statute of a general nature was passed in i839.- It enumerated the
subjects of embezzlement as "any money, goods, rights in action, or
other valuable security or effects whatever." The same phrase was con-
tinued in the next general act passed in x869.' In i88I the phrase
"anything of value" was substituted.' Thus, there had been, at the
time of the Toney case, a very similar change in both statutes practically
contemporaneous. Moreover, the change in the false pretense statute
had been initiated by the commission on general revision while the
change in the embezzlement statute was made by separate enactment.
Indeed if the doctrine of construing legislative intent by the history of a
statute is to be invoked, the reenactment of "anything of value" in the
embezzlement statute in the general revision of 191 o and in the separate
law of 1925' could be construed as ratifying the interpretation of the
phrase adopted in the Toney case in I9O9.
Both the Toney case and the principal case would seem to depend
upon the statute which defines "anything of value." 7 The construction
of that definition as including real property seems to be necessary to the
decision in the Toney case. The prosecutor's chief argument in that
case, according to his brief as summarized in the official report,' was on
the meaning of the statutory definition. If the court had accepted the
argument of Toney's attorney9 that things which savored of the realty
were included but that realty itself was not, a contrary decision would
seem to have been required. The position and wording of the defining
statute indicates that it is not intended merely to suggest additional
items, but to cover the whole field.
It is to be noted that some of the verbs indicating the conduct con-
37 Ohio Laws 74, sec. i.
'66 Ohio Laws z9, sec. i.
78 Ohio Laws 186.
x i Ohio Laws ios.
'Ohio G.C., sec. iz369 uses the word "includes" and it is possible to say that it
means different things in different places on that account. The only statute mentioned in
the syllabus of the Toney case was the false pretense statute.
'8i Ohio St. 130, at 132.
' 8x Ohio St. 13o, at 136.
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demned by the Ohio embezzlement statute may, but need not, embrace
physical movement of a physical thing. From this aspect it would seem
that "anything of value" could include both asportable and non-asport-
able' property. The verbs "embezzle" and "convert" in the embezzle-
ment statute are at least as broad" as the verb "obtain" in the false
pretense statute from the point of view of the type of acts condemned.
Broadly speaking the embezzlement statute is aimed at the wrongful
exercise of dominion over property by persons in certain relationships
resulting in economic loss; and, such dominion may, as a practical mat-
ter, be exercised without asportation.
It is difficult to see why the legislature should have intended to
prescribe a different rule for embezzlement from that applicable to
obtaining property by false pretenses.' 2  Title to real property may be
wrongfully but irrevocably transferred by a fiduciary to a bona fide
"'A credit not evidenced by any instrument can be embezzled. Higbee v. State, 74
Neb. 331, 104 N.W. 748 (iso5). A recent Ohio conviction seems to have been sustained
rn the theory that a failure to account, by one in charge of the financial affairs of a
company, is itself the substantive offense. Young v. State, 44 Ohio App. 1, 7, 554 N.E.
24 (1932).
'" There is no provision covering Part Fourth of the Code comparable to 0.C., sec.
io24 covering Part Third, which reads in part as follows: " . . .The rule of the
common law that statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed has no appli-
caition to such (Third) part; but this section shall not be so construed as to require a
liberal contruction of provisions affecting personal liberty .. . or of a penal nature."
Of course a statute defining a crime is not to be extended by construction. U. S. v. Wilt-
Srg,r 5 Wheat. (IS U. S.) 76, S L. Ed. 37 (aSzo); State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340,
47 N.E. 138 (1897). Yet penal provisions are to be fairly construed according to the
expres--ed legislative intent and mere verbal nicety or forced construction is not to be
utilized to exonerate persons plainly within the terms of the statute. Barker v. State,
69 Ohio St. 68, 68 N.E. 575 (1903)5 Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio St. 5z, 78 N.E. 957,
6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1154 (19o6); State v. Vausc, 84 Ohio St. 207, 95 N.E. 742, Ann Cas.
1912C, 513 (igi). The rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed does not
require a con truction defeating the legislature's plain intent. Wilson v. State, z6 Ohio
App. 7, x59 N.E. S5g (I9zS); Donnelly v. U. S., 276 U.S. 5o5, 512, 48 Sup. Ct- 400,
72 L.Ed. 676 (1928). One Ohio per curiam opinion puts it this way: "Most of our
antiquated technical precedents had their beginning in a period of English jurisprudence
vxhen more than two hundred crimes were capital. The hardships and severities of the
law were .uch that it was as difficult for an innocent man to escape conviction as it now
i, for a guilty man to be convicted." State v. Gross, 91 Ohio St. x6s, 11o N.E. 466
(1914). Cf. Snyder, The Influence of Equity Principles in Embezzlement Prosecutions,
3o I1l. L.Rev. 99S (1936).
"-A distinction is possible. The embezzlement statute carries a heavier maximum
penalty than the false pretense statute. G.C. sec. 13125 making the conveyance of land
vsithrut title a criminal often e, might be intended to cover such a case, but this statute
has never been applied to a receiver and could hardly be applied where the fiduciary act-
ually holds legal or equitable title.
The receiver is an agent of the court and might be punished by contempt proceed-
ing . 0.C. sec. 5Z37. However, the maximum plenalty for contempt under 0.0. sec.
12142 would not be at all comparable to that provided by the embezzlement statute.
G.C. cec. xaS96 requiring receivers to give bond for the faithful performance of
their dutie3 would seem to give the same protection to interested parties who had been
injured by the crime of false pretenses.
'3 It is quite possible that an escrow holder, if not a receiver, could enable another
to pass good title under certain circumstances. See note, 3 O.S.L.J. 225 (1937) and cases
79 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1939
purchaser under circumstances which preclude the possibility of a prose-
cution for embezzlement of the proceeds-as, for example, where the
entire purchase price, paid or to be paid for the property, has not come
into the hands of the fiduciary. Such a state of facts is suggested by the
principal case. Real property would seem to deserve the protection of the
criminal law in such a case quite as much as other species of property.
Is the culprit to go unpunished if the property is wrongfully sold and
the fiduciary is judgment proof? 4
Neither embezzlement nor obtaining property by false pretenses was
a crime at common law. 5 The first English Act included only person-
alty"6 but that should have little bearing on our law, assuming that the
Ohio statute was designed to relax the rigidity of the common law rule.
Although several cases outside of Ohio have held that real property
may be the subject of obtaining property by false pretenses," there
seem to be only two cases on the embezzlement of real property in the
English and American reports. Real property was held not subject to
embezzlement in Manning v. State, 175 Ga. 875, 166 S.E. 658
(1932). In People v. Roland, 134 Cal. App. 675, 26 P. (2d) 517
(1933) the court reached the contrary conclusion. Neither case relies
strongly on the particular statute involved. However, a doubt as to the
value of the Roland case as a precedent may be raised because of the
California statute," which specifically mentions real property. The
case is in accord, however, with a broad and practical conception of how
a person entrusted with property acts to convert it.' 9
A reading of the opinion in the principal case leaves one with the
there cited. A very broad statute in Massachusetts making the recording of any instru-
ment affecting the title of land conclusive evidence of the delivery of such instrument
would seem to permit reliance on recorded title in many of such instances. Mass. Laws
Ann. (1933) vol. 6, c. 183, sec. S.
" In such a case, note that any recovery on the bond mentioned in footnote 5z
would be against the bondsman and not against the guilty fiduciary.
15z Wharton's criminal Law (Twelfth Ed. by Ruppenthal, 1932) sees. sz58 and
1395, respectively.
6 33 Hen. 6, Ch. s (1455). By the English Larceny Act of 1861 the term "any
property" was used to describe the subject of larceny. 24 and 25 Vict., Ch. 96 sec. So.
By the same act (sec. i) property was defined to include both real and personal property.
"Any property" is still used in the English Embezzlement Acts and therein still defined
in substantially the same way. Larceny Act of s916, 6 and 7 Geo. 5, Ch. 5o sec. Zo
(iv) (a), sec. zi and sec. 46.
"Morse v. State, 9 Ga. App. 424, 71 S.E. 699 (i911); State v. Blake, 36 Utah
6o5, ioS Pac. 95o (igog); People v. Rabe, zoz Cal. 409, z61 Pac. 303 (9z7)i People
v. Maddux, soz Cal. App. x69, 282 Pac. 996 (x929). Contra: State v. Layman, 8
Blackf. (Ind.) 330 (846); Luce v. State, (Tex. Cr. App.) 224 S.W. 1095 (1920)5
State v. Klinkenberg, 76 Wash. 466, 136 Pac. 692, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 965, Ann. Cas.
19i5D, 468 (913). Of course the particular statute involved in each case substantially
affects the problem.
"s See note, 8 So. Calif. L. Rev. 44 (1934).
10 See Snyder, Word Magic and the Embezzlement of Real Property, z8 Jour. Crim
L. and Crim. 564 (1937). The author also criticizes the Manning case.
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impression that the Court of Appeals would limit the doctrine of State v.
Toney to the exact facts of that case. It is to be regretted that the court
felt compelled to undertake the task of limitation. Conceding that this
was a close case of statutory construction and recognizing that the
principal case does not contradict the syllabus of the Toney case, it is sub-
mitted that the holding is not in harmony with the construction of the
statute defining "anything of value" bearing the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court, nor with the purpose and intent of the embezzlement
statute. A.N.M.
CRIMINAL LAW - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
R.ECOMMENDATION OF MERCY
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree without a
recommendation of mercy. Error was claimed in the trial court's charge
to the jury on the recommendation of mercy and in its refusal to
charge as requested by the defendant. The trial court answered a ques-
tion propounded by the jury, as to whether or not they could consider
"sociological matters and environment" in recommending or refusing
to recommend mercy, by saying, "No, that has nothing to do with the
case." The Supreme Court held that the jury's discretion was limited
to the facts and circumstances of the case as disclosed by the evidence,
and hence there was no error in the trial court's ruling.'
Ohio G.C. sec. 12400 provides that first degree murder "shall be
punished by death unless the jury trying the accused recommend
mercy . . . " The court in the principal case follows the rule of
Howell v. State, holding that the jury is to be confined to the evidence
in exercising its discretion to recommend or withhold mercy.2 The
majority opinion in that case is severely criticized by Judge Robinson in
a strong dissenting opinion' which was based upon the absence of any
indication in the statute of a legislative intent to control the discretion
of the jury in any respect whatsoever.
Outside of Ohio the courts have held under similar statutes that the
discretion of the jury in giving or withholding a recommendation of
mercy is not confined or limited by any rule of law or by the evidence
or testimony of the case.4 The Georgia court has held that the discre-
'State v. Caldwell, 135 Ohio St. 424, 21 N.E. (2d) 343, 14 Ohio Op. 320 (x939)-
2 Howell v. State, oz Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 76, 17 A.L.R. xioS (19z).
'Rehfetd v. State, xoz Ohio St. 431, 131 N.E. 71z (1921); Howell v. State, 102
Ohio St. 411, at 424.
"Inza v. State, 7z Ga. z69 (1884)5 State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac.
632, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 532, L.R.A. 1916 D 590 (1913); Cook v. State, 46 Fla. 36, 35 So.
665 (1903)5 Winston v. Un'!!ed States, 172 U.S. 303, 43 L.Ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. 21z
(9SgS)5 State v. King, x58 S.C. 2zi, 155 S.E. 409 (903).
